FIRST GRADER essay writing company is the ideal place for homework help. If you are looking for affordable, custom-written, high-quality and non-plagiarized papers, your student life just became easier with us. Click the button below to place your order.
Order a Similar Paper Order a Different Paper
1. There are allegations of price-fixing in the U.S. chicken meat market. See https://www.law360.com/articles/839282/tyson-perdue-poultry-cos-targeted-again-over-price-fixing. What are Porter’s five forces for this particular industry? In light of your five forces analysis, does it seem reasonable that there could be effective collusion in this industry?
2. Suppose there are several large multi-product multi-national firms in an industry. Chemicals and Electronics are examples. Suppose each of these firms is running and/or involved in over 50 separate product cartels. What are the advantages to a single firm from being involved in, say, 100 cartels in contrast to the aggregate of 100 single product firms each being involved in a cartel?
3. In the Hitachi Plea Agreement for price-fixing in the capacitor cartel (https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/325416), ceramic capacitors are conspicuously omitted from the Plea Agreement. Yet, ceramic capacitors are widely used and considered to be good substitutes for other kinds of capacitors (at least in the intermediate run). How could the capacitor cartel be effective in elevating prices and profits if a major substitute product (ceramic capacitors) was omitted from the collusive agreement?
4. See https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/334026. What are the auction rules for these public real estate foreclosure auctions? If asked by the state of California for advice on a complete revision of these auctions so as to encumber collusion, what would you propose?
5. The European truck cartel (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39824/39824_6567_14.pdf) involved a number of firms that are familiar names in the vehicle market (http://inconvenienttruck.eu/the-economics-of-trucks-industry/). How could these firms operate a cartel only in Europe? Also, many of these firms, if not all, are involved in the production of passenger vehicles as well. Given what is publicly known about the truck cartel as well as the passenger automobile market, is it reasonable to conjecture that there has also been a cartel functioning in the passenger vehicle market in Europe?